Abstract-Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-Based Proxy ReEncryption (CP-ABPRE) extends the traditional Proxy ReEncryption (PRE) by allowing a semi-trusted proxy to transform a ciphertext under an access policy to the one with the same plaintext under another access policy (i.e.attributebased re-encryption). The proxy, however, learns nothing about the underlying plaintext. CP-ABPRE has many real world applications, such as fine-grained access control in cloud storage systems and medical records sharing among different hospitals. Previous CP-ABPRE schemes leave how to be secure against Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks (CCA) as an open problem. This paper, for the first time, proposes a new CP-ABPRE to tackle the problem. The new scheme supports attribute-based re-encryption with any monotonic access structures. Despite our scheme is constructed in the random oracle model, it can be proved CCA secure under the decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption.
I. INTRODUCTION
Introduced by Sahai and Waters [1] , Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE), which is a generalization of Identity-Based Encryption (IBE), can effectively increase the flexibility of data sharing such that only parties satisfying specific policy are allowed to access the data. It comes in two flavors: one is the Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE), and the other is the Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In the former, ciphertexts are labeled with attribute sets and private keys are associated with access structures that specify which kinds of ciphertexts the receiver is able to decrypt. In the latter, however, the case is complementary. That is, ciphertexts are related to access structures, and attribute sets are assigned to private keys. ABE is applicable to many network applications, such as targeted broadcast and audit log applications [2] .
We use medical data sharing as an example to illustrate the usage of CP-ABE and motivate our work. Suppose a heart-disease patient Alice would like to find a clinic for regular medical examination via an on-line medical service agent (e.g., healthgrades 1 ). The clinic must be within 10 km of Campbelltown, the doctors (assigned to her) of the clinic must be the senior attending doctors and be expert at cardiology. For convenience, we denote the requirements as I 1 = {Cardiology ∧ Senior Attending Doctor ∧ Location : within 10 km of Campbelltown}. Without loss of confidentiality, Alice prefers to encrypt the record under I 1 (i.e. Enc(I 1 , m Alice )) before sending to the on-line agent. The agent (that knows I 1 ) then searches candidates satisfying I 1 in its database. Suppose there is a clinic matching I 1 . The agent forwards the ciphertext to the clinic. Here the agent cannot access the medical data without knowledge of the private key corresponding to the ciphertext.
Upon receiving the ciphertext, the clinic satisfying I 1 can access Alice's record using its private key. To maintain the record, the clinic may back up the ciphertext locally. Suppose some medical cooperation is required in the process of the treatment, Alice's record has to be transferred to hospitals with the following requirements. The hospitals have to be within 15 km of Hurstville, and the doctors (assigned to the cooperation) of the hospitals should be the attending or chief doctors and must be expert at cardiology as well. Denote the requirements as I 2 = {Cardiology ∧ (Attending Doctor ∨ Chief Doctor) ∧ Location : within 15 km of Hurstville}. Suppose there are two hospitals, say A and B, which satisfy I 2 .
Traditionally, sharing Alice's medical record with A and B (without losing confidentiality), the clinic has to first recover m Alice and further encrypt the record under I 2 (i.e. Enc(I 2 , m Alice )) before sending to hospitals. However, if there are N patients who need to be cooperatively treated, the clinic suffers from N pairs of encryption and decryption for the patients' records (See Fig. 1 ). This might be undesirable in practice due to high computational complexity.
To make data sharing be more efficiently, Proxy Re- Encryption (PRE) is proposed. Defined by Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [3] , PRE supports the delegation of decryption rights. It allows a semi-trusted party called proxy to transform a ciphertext intended for Alice into another ciphertext of the same plaintext intended for Bob. The proxy, however, learns neither the decryption keys nor the underlying plaintext. PRE is applicable to many applications, such as secure distributed files systems [4] and email forwarding [3] . To date, PRE has been extended to adapt the context of ABE. Liang et al. [5] proposed the first CiphertextPolicy Attribute-Based PRE (CP-ABPRE) scheme, in which a proxy is allowed to transform a ciphertext under a specified access policy into the one under another access policy (i.e.
attribute-based re-encryption).
Using CP-ABPRE the medical records sharing can be efficiently fulfilled (See Fig. 2 ). The clinic, acting as a delegator, notifies a cloud server (acting as the proxy) that the hospitals satisfying I 2 (i.e., delegatees), should be granted the decryption rights of the ciphertexts under I 1 . The server will then transform the ciphertexts under I 1 to the ones under I 2 using a re-encryption key (e.g., rk I1→I2 generated by the clinic), such that A and B (satisfying I 2 ) can access the records. Note that the server does not learn the contents (of the medical records).
Previous CP-ABPRE schemes (e.g., [5] , [6] , [7] ), however, are only secure against Chosen-Plaintext Attacks (CPA). CPA security might be not sufficient in practice as it only achieves the very basic security requirement, i.e. secrecy against "passive" eavesdroppers. When CP-ABPRE is implemented in a large system, a much wider array of attacks are possible. For example, an adversary may have control over ciphertexts so as to affect decryption values or learn some partial information from decryption. Therefore, it is desirable to propose CCA secure CP-ABPRE in practice. However, the existence of CP-ABPRE with chosen-ciphertext security has been open.
Another open problem left by previous CP-ABPRE schemes (such as [5] ), which only support AND-gates over attributes, is how to support any monotonic access policy. In practical use, it is desirable to enable a CP-ABPRE to support expressive and flexible realization for access policy. This paper also deals with this problem.
A. Our Contributions
In this work we formalize the definition for CP-ABPRE. Specifically, in our definition an attribute set and an access structure are required as auxiliary input to the re-encryption key algorithm; meanwhile, an attribute set is required in the input to the private key generation and decryption algorithms.
Regarding to the security models, we propose the selective access structure and chosen ciphertext security (IND-sAS-CCA) notion for CP-ABPRE. Note that it is the first time to define chosen ciphertext security model for CP-ABPRE in the literature. We consider the IND-sAS-CCA game into two different aspects: one is to allow the adversary to achieve an original ciphertext as the challenge ciphertext; the other is to allow the adversary to achieve a re-encrypted ciphertext as challenge. We refer to the security of the former and the latter as IND-sAS-CCA security at original ciphertext (i.e. IND-sAS-CCA-Or) and IND-sAS-CCA security at reencrypted ciphertext (i.e. IND-sAS-CCA-Re), respectively. We also show that the IND-sAS-CCA-Or security implies selective collusion resistance, which is also named as selective master key security in [6] .
As previously mentioned, the construction of a CP-ABPRE with CCA security remains open. This paper proposes the first single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE to tackle the problem. It is worth mentioning that the existing CP-ABPRE schemes (e.g., [5] ) only support AND-gates on (multi-valued) positive and negative attributes, while our scheme provides any monotonic access formula. Despite our scheme is constructed in the random oracle model, it can be proved collusion resistant and IND-sAS-CCA secure under the decisional q-parallel bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent (q-parallel BDHE) assumption.
Difficulty of Converting Previous CPA-Secure CP-ABPRE to Be Secure against CCA. As stated in [5] , the CCA security construction for CP-ABPRE is a challenging open problem. One might think that some cryptographic Figure 2 . Ciphertext-policy attribute-based proxy re-encryption primitives could help, such as the CHK transformation [8] . Despite the well-known CHK transformation can be used to convert a CPA-secure PKE scheme to be secure against CCA, it cannot be trivially employed in the PRE setting. It is used to prevent ciphertext from being mutated, but meanwhile, PRE allows transformation among ciphertexts. If an encryptor uses the CHK transformation to guarantee the validity of ciphertexts, it will easily incur that the validity of re-encryption results cannot be ensured. Thus, trivially employ the transformation in a PRE scheme that often results in Replayable CCA (RCCA) security [9] . The classic examples are [10] , [11] .
Therefore, using the CHK transformation as a black box to turn the existing CPA-secure CP-ABPRE schemes to be secure against CCA that is not trivial. In section IV, we show an efficient solution to address the difficulty.
B. Related Work
Please refer to our full paper [12] for the related work of ABE, PRE and CP-ABPRE.
We compare our scheme with [5] , [6] , [7] in terms of public/private key size, ciphertext/re-encryption key size, re-encryption cost and properties (see Table 1 ). Let f be the size of access formula, A be the number of attributes on user's private key, U be the number of all attributes used in system, mv, +, − be multi-valued, positive and negative attribute, respectively. Besides, denote c e and c p as the computational cost of an exponentiation and a bilinear pairing. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first of its kind to achieve CCA security and to support any monotonic access formula (over attributes).
C. Organization
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In section II, we introduce some basic definitions and security models for CP-ABPRE. In section III, we review some primitives and complexity assumption which are used in our scheme. In section IV we propose an efficient CCA-secure CP-ABPRE scheme. Finally, we conclude our work and discuss some open problems in section V.
II. DEFINITIONS AND SECURITY MODELS
Definition 1: Access Structure [13] .
An access structure (resp., monotonic access structure) is a collection (resp., monotone collection) AS of non-empty subsets of P, i.e., AS ⊆ 2 P \ {∅}. The sets in AS are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in AS are called the unauthorized sets.
In this paper the role of the parties is taken by the attributes. The access structure AS contains all authorized sets of attributes. In this paper we work on monotone access structures. As shown in [13] , any monotone access structure can be represented by a linear secret sharing scheme.
Definition 2: Linear Secret Sharing Schemes (LSSS) [14] . A secret-sharing scheme Π over a set of parties P is called linear (over Z p ) if
• The shares for each party form a vector over Z p .
• There exists a matrix an M with l rows and n columns called the share-generating matrix for Π. For all i = 1, ..., l, the ith row of M is labeled by a party ρ(i), where ρ is a function from {1, ..., l} to P. When we consider the column vector v = (s, r 2 , ..., r n ), where s ∈ Z p is the secret to be shared, and r 2 , ..., r n ∈ Z p are randomly chosen, then M · v is the vector of l shares of the secret s according to Π. The share (M · v) i belongs to party ρ(i). For any unauthorized set, no such constants exist. We use LSSS matrix (M, ρ) to represent an access policy in this paper. Every LSSS according to the definition achieves the linear reconstruction property [13] . Suppose that Π is an LSSS for the access structure AS. Let S ∈ AS (that is, S satisfies the access structure; we also denote this case as S |= (M, ρ)) be any authorized set, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, ..., l} be defined as I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. There will exist constants {w i ∈ Z p } i∈I such that i∈I w i · λ i = s if {λ i } are valid shares of any secret s according to Π. Note that as shown in [13] {w i } can be found (with knowledge of M and I) in time polynomial in the size of the share-generating matrix M . [5] , [6] , [7] Schemes 
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A. Definition of CP-ABPRE Definition 3:
A Single-Hop Unidirectional CiphertextPolicy Attribute-Based Proxy Re-Encryption (CP-ABPRE) scheme consists of the following seven algorithms:
on input a security parameter k ∈ N and an attribute universe U, output a public parameter param and a master secret key msk.
msk and an attribute set S that describes the key, output a private key sk S . Like traditional CP-ABE each private key sk S is associated with an attribute set S.
on input param, a private key sk S and the corresponding attribute set S, and an access structure (M , ρ ) for attributes over U, output a re-encryption key rk S→(M ,ρ ) that can be used to transform a ciphertext under (M, ρ) to the one under (M , ρ ),
an access structure (M, ρ) for attributes over U , and a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} k , output an original ciphertext C (M,ρ) which can be further re-encrypted. Suppose the access structure is implicitly included in the ciphertext.
an attribute set S and its corresponding private key sk S , and an original ciphertext
param, an attribute set S and its corresponding private key sk S , and a re-encrypted ciphertext C
2 Suppose (M, ρ) and (M , ρ ) are two access structures. For any attribute x satisfies (M, ρ), x does not satisfy (M , ρ ). For such a case, from now on, we say that (M, ρ) and (M , ρ ) are disjoint.
For simplicity, we omit param in the expression of the algorithm inputs in the rest of the paper.
Correctness: For any k ∈ N, any attribute set S (S ⊆ U) with its cardinality polynomial to k, any access structure (M, ρ) for attributes over U and any message
, for all S used in the system, we have 
Dec(S, sk S , Enc((M, ρ), m))
= m; Dec R (S , sk S , ReEnc(ReKeyGen(sk S , S, (M , ρ )), Enc((M, ρ), m))) = m,
where S |= (M, ρ) and S |= (M , ρ ).

B. Security Models
on input an attribute set S, an access structure (M , ρ ), and 
A makes further queries except the following:
ii. If A has issued a re-encryption key query on (S, (M , ρ )) to obtain the re-encryption key rk S→(M ,ρ ) , and achieved C
6) Guess. A outputs a guess bit b ∈ {0, 1}. The advantage of A is defined as (1 k , U ) is negligible for any PPT adversary A in the following experiment. ρ  *  ) ) or invalid re-encrypted ciphertexts, the oracle outputs ⊥, where S |= (M * , ρ * ). We now proceed to the selective collusion resistance for CP-ABPRE. Like collusion resistance defined in traditional PRE, this security notion also guarantees that a dishonest proxy cannot compromise the entire private key of the delegator even it colludes with the corresponding delegatee. However, an adversary is required to output an attribute set that it wishes to attack before the setup phase. The selective collusion resistance model can be defined via the identical manner introduced in [5] , [6] , we hence omit the details. Instead, we prefer to show that the IND-sAS-CCAOr security already implies selective collusion resistance.
Theorem 1: Suppose a single-hop unidirectional CP-ABPRE scheme is IND-sAS-CCA-Or secure, then it is selective collusion resistant as well.
Please refer to [12] for the proof of Theorem 1.
III. PRELIMINARIES
Bilinear Maps. Let BSetup denote an algorithm that, on input the security parameter 1 k , outputs the parameters for a bilinear map as (p, g, G, G T , e) , where G and G T are two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order p ∈ Θ(2 k ) and g is a generator of G. The efficient mapping e : G × G → G T has three properties: (1) Bilinearity:
(2) Nondegeneracy: e(g, g) = 1 GT , where 1 GT is the unit of G T ; (3) Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
Complexity Assumption. 
and g is a generator of G. Define Adv Target Collision Resistant (TCR) Hash Function. The definition of TCR hash function can be found in [16] we hence omit the details.
IV. A NEW CP-ABPRE WITH CCA SECURITY
In this section we propose a new CP-ABPRE in the random oracle model with CCA security. Prior to describing the scheme, we introduce some intuition behind our construction. We choose Waters ABE [14] as a basic building block due to the following reasons. Waters ABE utilizes LSSS to support any monotonic access formula that is a desirable and practical property for our system. Besides, the construction technique for ciphertexts, which ensures ciphertext size to be linear in the size of formula other than all system attributes, enables us to relieve the communication cost incurred by re-encrypted ciphertext and re-encryption key.
Our CP-ABPRE works as follows. Unless stated otherwise, we let U be the attribute universe in the system, and S be an attribute set, S ⊆ U.
. Given a security parameter k and the at-
p , a random generator g 1 ∈ G, and set the following TCR hash functions
, and the master secret key is msk = g α . 2) KeyGen(msk, S). Given a master secret key msk and an attribute set S, choose t ∈ R Z * p , and set the private key sk S as
3) Enc((M, ρ), m).
Taking an LSSS access structure (M, ρ) (M is an l × n matrix, and the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes) and a message m ∈ {0, 1} k as input, the encryption algorithm works as follows. 
s , and output the original ciphertext C (M,ρ) = ((M, ρ),
Note that {ρ(i)|1 ≤ i ≤ l} are the attributes used in the access structure (M, ρ). Like [14] , we allow an attribute to be associated with multiple rows of matrix M , i.e. the function ρ is not injective. 4) ReKeyGen(sk S , S, (M , ρ ) ). Given a private key sk S = (K, L, K x ) and the corresponding attribute set S, and an LSSS access structure (M , ρ ), the reencryption key is generated as follows, where x ∈ S, M is an l × n matrix, and the function ρ associates rows of M to attributes. a) Choose β , δ ∈ R {0, 1} k , set s = H 1 (δ, β ) and a random vector v = (s , y 2 , ..., y n ), where
, and output the re-encryption key 
If C 1 ) , and output ⊥ otherwise. A 1 , A 3 , (B 1 , C 1 ) , ..., (B l , C l ), (M, ρ)) H1(m,β) and S |= (M, ρ), and output ⊥ otherwise.
• Correctness for Original Ciphertext. , g) α·s ) = m||β.
• Correctness for Re-Encrypted Ciphertext. , g) α·s ) = m||β.
Before giving the formal security analysis, we first give some intuition as to why the scheme is secure against CCA. For the CCA security of original ciphertext, we let C * (M * ,ρ * ) = ((M * , ρ * ), A
